Let S = Q n i=1 S i be the strategy space for a nite n-person game. Let (s 10 ; : : : ; s n0 ) 2 S be any strategy n-tuple, and let T i = S i ?fs i0 g, i = 1; : : : ; n. We show that the maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria to a game with strategy sets S i is the number of partitions P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g of i T i such that, for each i, #P i = #T i and P i \ T i = ;. The bound is tight, as we give a method for constructing a game with the maximum number of equilibria.
1 Introduction Harsanyi's (1973) theorem states that, for generic (that is, outside an exceptional set whose closure has Lesbesgue measure zero) payo s of a normal form, there are nitely many Nash equilibria, all of them`regular.' Roughly, an equilibrium is regular if the strategies assigned no probability have strictly suboptimal expected payo s, and the derivative of those equilibrium conditions that are satis ed with equality is nonsingular. Harsanyi's methods do not su ce to show that there is a maximal number of regular equilibria, but this is a consequence of Bezout's theorem. For any regular equilibrium, the implicit function theorem implies that nearby payo s have nearby regular equilibria, so the maximal number of regular equilibria is attained on an open subset of the set of payo s.
A Nash equilibrium is totally mixed if every pure strategy is assigned positive probability. Any Nash equilibrium gives rise to a totally mixed equilibrium of the smaller game obtained by eliminating all unused pure strategies, so the maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria is a lower bound for the maximal number of regular Nash equilibria.
Let S = Q n i=1 S i be the strategy space for a nite n-person game. Let (s 10 ; : : : ; s n0 ) 2 S be any strategy in n-tuple, and let T i = S i ? fs i0 g, i = 1; : : : ; n. We show that the maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria to a game with strategy sets S i is the number of partitions P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g of i T i such that #P i = #T i and P i \T i = ;
for all i. This result has implications for the complexity of the various computational problems arising out of the concepts of noncooperative game theory, most obviously for the problem of enumerating all equilibria. In x5 we provide closed form upper and lower bounds on the number of partitions described in the preceding paragraph. Roughly, the lower bound implies that the maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria grows rapidly with the number of agents and the numbers of pure strategies they can choose from. For example, xing the number of pure strategies for each agent, the maximal number is { 1 { exponential in the number of agents, while if we x the number of agents, the maximal number is exponential in the minimum number of pure strategies for any one player. Here we illustrate these results in the following table giving the maximal number for normal forms in which each of n agents has k pure strategies to choose from. Maximum generic number of totally mixed Nash equilibria for an n-person game, where each player has k pure strategies Another immediate consequence of our characterization is that if S i is the largest strategy set, then a necessary and su cient condition for there to exist payo s for which there is a totally mixed regular Nash equilibrium is that (#S i ? 1) P j6 =i (#S j ? 1). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In x2 we show how to transform the usual expression of the conditions of totally mixed Nash equilibrium into a form that is well suited for our analysis. The transformed system developed in x2 eliminates one variable for each player and eliminates the requirements that probabilities add to one and are positive. We show that the transformed system has the same maximal number of regular solutions as the original system. The transformed algebraic system consists only of equations, and makes sense as a system of equations in several complex variables with complex coe cients. This allows us in x3 to apply a remarkable theorem of Bernstein (1975) (who built on the work of Kushnirenko (1975) ) to obtain a combinatoric characterization of the number of complex regular solutions of the transformed system for payo s that are generic in the space of complex payo s. Since each regular equilibrium can be extended locally (in the { 2 { space of complex payo s) to a branch of the equilibrium correspondence, this number is automatically an upper bound on the maximal number of regular totally mixed equilibria for real payo s.
In x4 we construct a real payo for the game in which all equilibria are regular, and there are as many (real) equilibria as are allowed by Bernstein's theorem. Thus it follows that this is the maximum possible number of regular totally mixed equlibria, and there is an open set of real payo s on which this number is attained.
In x5 we provide a recursive combinatoric characterization of the number derived from the application of Bernstein's theorem to our problem, and this characterization is used to develop closed form upper and lower bounds. In x6 we illustrate our results by analysing in detail the simplest non-trivial example, the three person game where each player has two strategies.
A Sequence of Related Problems
We consider a nite player, nite strategy normal form game determined by a set of players I = f1;:::;ng, and nite nonempty disjoint sets of pure strategies S 1 ; : : : ; S n . For each i let d i = #S i ? 1, and let S i = fs i0 ; : : : ; s id i g. De ne S = Q i2I S i .
For each i 2 I, let i be the set of all functions i : S i ! R. Let = Q i2I i , and let ?i = Q j6 =i j . We write ik = i (s ik ). The projection of 2 onto ?i will typically be denoted by ?i . We will often write s i in place of the corresponding unit vector in i , s in place of the corresponding element in , and so forth.
Let U be the set of multilinear (that is, linear in each agent's strategy) functions u :
! R, and U = U I . The speci cation of an element u = (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) 2 U is equivalent to the customary description of a payo function for an n person normal form game, since u i is determined by the vector (u i (s)) s2S via the formula
We will only be concerned with totally mixed equilibria. The following is an algebraic { 3 { expression of the condition that 2 is a totally mixed Nash equilibrium: We say that , a totally mixed equilibrium for u, is regular if is a regular point of v = proj(u). (That is, dv : T ! T v( ) Y is surjective at , where T and T v( ) Y are the tangent spaces of and Y at and v( ) respectively.) De ne U k] to be the set of all u 2 U for which there are at least k regular totally mixed equilibria. It follows from the implicit function theorem that if is a regular equilibrium for u, then nearby payo s have nearby regular equilibria. So U k] is an open set, for all k. Let k be the maximum k for which U k] is not empty. (That such a k exists is a consequence of Bezout's theorem, and also of its generalization by Kushnirenko and Bernstein, which we present in x3.) We want to characterize k . Now note that the components of such a v are homogeneous polynomials. Therefore, the truth value of the condition v( ) = 0 is una ected by replacing any i with i i for any nonzero scalar i . From this point of view (c 1 ) is a normalization specifying a particular representative of each n-dimensional space of solutions of (a 1 ). But it will be more convenient in the analysis to use a di erent normalization, namely i0 = 1, since in this way we eliminate one variable for each agent. For any nite set of regular solutions of (a 2 ), say f 1 ; : : : ; k g, it is possible to nd 0 such that (b 2 ) is satis ed by each j ? 0 . The consequence of this is that if the set of w 2 W having a certain number of regular solutions of (a 2 ) has a nonempty interior, then so does the set of w having that number of regular solutions of (a 2 ), and (b 2 ). Hence, For any w 2 W, as long as the set of regular solutions, f 1 ; : : : ; k g, of w can be computed, the proof of lemma 2.1 provides a means of constructing a corresponding normal form game u 2 U with k regular Nash equilibria: Find 0 2 T such that j > 0 for all k. Then any u 2 proj ?1 ?1 (w 0 ) will have k regular solutions at f 1 ; : : : ; k g, where j = ?1 ( j ? 0 ). Section 4 provides a method to nd a w 2 W k ] for which the j can be computed. Together with the above argument, this gives a constructive method to nd a normal form game with the maximum number of regular Nash equilibria. Bernstein's (1975) theorem, which we apply in x3, considers solutions in which no variable vanishes. Thus we take our goal to be the characterization of the maximal number of regular solutions of the system ( ) (a 3 ) 0 = w( ); (b 3 ) 0 6 = ik :
3 The Number of Complex Nash Equlibria
Since it contains no inequalities, the system ( ) makes sense over the eld of complex numbers, and in this section we study it in that context. Proof: Using the general fact that, for sets E 1 ; E 2 R k and F 1 ; F 2 R`, Kushnirenko (1975) and Bernstein (1975) give a combinatoric characterization of the generic number of complex roots of \sparse" systems of polynomials, where sparseness means that some of the coe cients are required to vanish, so that in e ect one is considering a coordinate subspace of the space of coe cients considered by Bezout's theorem. Speci cally, Bernstein's theorem states that the generic number of complex solutions of the system (*) is equal to the mixed volume, M(Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n ) of the sets Q i ; which is de ned as the coe cient of 11 : : : 1d 1 : : : n1 : : : 1d n in the expansion of ( ) as a polynomial in the variables ik : Let be the set of partitions P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g of T 1 : : : T n such that, for each i, #P i = d i and P i \ T i = ;. By expanding ( ) it is easy to obtain Theorem 3.3 : M(Q 1 ; : : : ; Q n ) is the number of elements of .
A Real System with the Generic Number of Regular Solutions
In this section we consider the special case of system ( ) in For the analysis of the complexity of various algorithms associated with the Nash equilibrium concept one wishes to know the asymptotic order of magnitude of the number of equilibria. On the one hand we may apply (c) inductively to obtain L n (c; d) (n ? 1) d 1 +:::+d n?2 :
(In fact this will coincide with the bound on the generic number of solutions resulting from Bezout's theorem.) The following lower bound is crude, in the sense that re nements seem possible, but it does provide the most basic information. which is, of course, the desired inequality. It remains only to consider the possibility that k < j, but in this case the condition i 6 = k is no longer imposed in the summation alone, with the consequence that the resulting lower bound is multiplied by n?j+1 n?j .
De ne A(n; k + 1) = L n (k; k), where k 2 R n is the vector of k's; this is the maximal generic number of equilibria for an n-person game in which each player has k + 1 pure strategies. It is this function whose values are displayed in Figure 1 .1. Also, de ne A 1 = 0, and for n > 1, A n = A(n; 2). 6 A Three Person Example
In this section we explore the algebra of the simplest case in which there can be multiple totally mixed equilibria, namely three players, each of whom has two pure strategies. As we will see, already the calculations are rather complicated.
Let S i = f0;1g, i = 1; 2; 3. Write i = i1 and w i h`= w 1 i (h;`), i = 1; 2; 3, h;`2 f0;1g, where w 1 i is the function de ned in x2. Then equations ( ) for an equilibrium become w 1 11 2 3 + w 1 10 2 + w 1 01 3 + w 1 00 = 0 w 2 11 1 3 + w 2 10 1 + w 2 01 3 + w 2 00 = 0 w 3 11 1 2 + w 3 10 1 + w 3 01 2 + w 3 00 = 0:
This system is equivalent to The solutions x 1 and x 2 are distinct if and only if 6 = 0. They are real if and only if 0; this will certainly be the case if any one of the three equations factor, in the sense that i = 0, in which case 1 2 3 = 0. One can work out the conditions under which the components of the roots are positive, but they are di cult to state and interpret.
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